Canakkale Hotel - Gallipoli

Gallipoli Peninsula which is located on the european side of the Canakkale Province, can be considered as one of the most attractive touristical spots particulary for Turkish, Australian, New Zealland, English tourists.

To honor about 500.000 brave soldiers, who lost their lives on the holly lands of the gallipoli peninsula ( gallipoli campaign) during World War I, the southern half of the peninsula now acts as a national park preserving that time in the history. This is the spirit and sign of the peace that show ‘ no war is cause for permanent hostilities but can serve as a basis for friendships as well '.

Istanbul, which guarded another narrow waterway, the Bosphorus, into the Black Sea, was very vulnerable to seaward attack. Such action had precedents: in 1807 a British squadron had forced the Narrows only to be becalmed and eventually forced to retreat before it could attack Istanbul. As recently as the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12, an Italian force had attacked the Dardanelles and penetrated as far as the defences of the Narrows. Even before the Ottoman Empire entered the war on 31 October 1914, the possibility of a Greek-Russian assault on the Dardanelles had been canvassed.

By late 1914, the British and French governments had agreed it was necessary to gain control of the straits known as the Dardanelles This would allow for co-ordinated deployment of Russian and allied troops. They approved a naval campaign, aimed at destroying or capturing Turkish fortifications along the length of the Dardenelles in order to open a secure passage for the navy on their way to Istanbul , capital of the Ottoman Government. However, the role of small Turkish mine-layer Nusrat by laying mines in the morning of March 18th had changed the destiny of the naval battle. During this operation three ships from the Allied Fleet had been sunk and three badly damaged. Almost eighteen battleships entered the straits such as Queen Elizabeth, Lord Nelson, Agamemmon, Inflexible, Ocean, Irresistible, Prince George and Majestic from Britain and the Gaulois, Bouvet and Suffren from France. Overall, three ships had been sunk and three more had been severely damaged such as Bouvet, Irresistable, and Ocean.

By April 1915 there had been fighting in World War I for eight months. Britain and France were facing Germany on the Western Front (northern France and Belgium); Russia was fighting Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary on the Eastern Front; Turkey was supporting Germany.

The British and French agreed to land troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula separating Europe from Asia. The aim of this was for the troops to move overland and attack the forts which were overlooking the Dardanelles Strait, and to seize the Turkish capital, Constantinople. Controlling the Dardanelles would enable allied ships to provide supplies to Russia, and put more pressure on the Eastern Front. It might also take Turkey out of the war. Ships alone had failed to take the Dardanelles. Therefore a landing of troops by sea was now decided on.

With the Turks advancing northwards in the Caucasus, Russia appealed for action to relieve the pressure. The need was fleeting-Russian forces soon drove the Turks back-but impetus had been given to Churchill's concept of an attack on Turkey. The tempting idea of inducing the Balkan states to join the Allies and attack Austria-Hungary from the south-east, never more than an illusion, was also influential. A campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean might, moreover, encourage Italy to enter the war on the Allied side.

These considerations were reinforced by the limited nature of the intended action. Despite the strong reservations of the commander of the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden), Churchill proposed a naval attack on the forts guarding the Narrows. His plan had the attraction of not requiring any substantial military forces for its implementation. Nor would it entail any diminution in Britain's naval position in the vital North Sea, since only older battleships would be used. The War Council approved the proposal on 15 January 1915.

Over the ensuing month Hamilton prepared his plan for the landing-not an easy task given the rugged nature of much of the peninsula's coastline. He chose as his main focus the southern part of the Gallipoli peninsula at Cape Helles and Sedd el Bahr. While the 29th Division landed there on five separate beaches, a subsidiary landing would be made by the ANZAC Corps about twenty kilometres up the coast, north of Gaba Tepe. The Australians and New Zealanders would seize the southern part of the Sari Bair ridge before advancing across the peninsula to Maidos, from where they would mount a threat to the Kilid Bahr plateau from the rear. The French division would meanwhile make a temporary landing on the Asian shore at Kum Kale to prevent Turkish gunners there bombarding the troops landing at Helles. To divert Turkish attention, the Royal Naval Division would make a feint attack at Bulair, at the narrow neck of the peninsula.

The landings were originally scheduled to take place on 23 April, but weather conditions led to a delay of two days. The first ashore were to be the ANZACs, who had moved forward to Lemnos in early April. The 3rd Australian Brigade would land before dawn and advance to Gun Ridge. Following them, the 2nd Australian Brigade would occupy the Sari Bair ridge as far as Hill 971. The 1st Australian Division's remaining brigade would land by 9 a.m. as divisional reserve

Australians landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula, at Ari Burnu (soon renamed Anzac Cove) before dawn on 25 April. The aim of the first wave of 1,500 Australian troops was to secure the beach and seize the high ground of the Third (or Gun) Ridge. Control of this high ground was vital for success. Later landings of the remaining 2,500 troops would then be able to push their way inland towards the forts of the Dardanelles. Finally, the remaining 21,000 Anzacs would be sent ashore to move inland under the protection of the first 4,000

Even if all had gone to plan on the 25th, the force would have struggled to secure its objectives, especially within the time allotted. But the plan was thrown into disarray even before the troops began landing. The Australian spearhead was mistakenly directed about two kilometres north of the envisaged landing place, nearer to Ari Burnu at what was later named Anzac Cove and on a much narrower front than envisaged in the plan. The reasons for this have been hotly debated over the last eighty years, with tides, faulty navigation by the landing fleet, belated changes of orders all being canvassed. An unauthorised alteration of direction northwards by one of the midshipmen commanding a steamboat, which pulled the whole line of tows in this direction, is the most likely explanation.

Meanwhile, at Anzac, the crisis had been surmounted. On the first night the situation had looked so dangerous that Birdwood had recommended evacuation, but this had been rejected by Hamilton, who was conscious that there was no means of carrying out such a plan. He could only urge the ANZACs to dig in. As they did so the position was gradually made more secure. Gaps in the line were plugged by further units of the New Zealand and Australian Division as they came ashore. As soon as possible, the original landing units were pulled out of the line and reorganised. Eventually Birdwood was able to establish two divisional sectors: the New Zealand and Australian Division took responsibility for the line north of Courtney's Post, and the 1st Australian Division south of it.

These preparations were timely, for from the 27th Kemal, having received reinforcements, began to intensify the pressure on the besieged ANZACs. The deployment in the enclave of four RND battalions at Anzac Cove bolstered the defences and allowed the reorganisation of the 1st Australian Division. It also raised the possibility of forcing back the besiegers.

An attack aimed at seizing the Baby 700 feature was eventually mounted on the evening of 2 May by the New Zealand and Australian Division, with the RND battalions in support. But the plan was too ambitious. Poorly prepared and coordinated—the Otago Battalion in particular failed to make its start-line in time—the assault failed.

The Gallipoli campaign was a costly failure. While it is possible to point to moments when tactical developments offered the promise of success, the outcome was determined by strategic factors. Essentially there were not enough men available at the crucial moments.

Hamilton launched the campaign with five divisions against a roughly comparable Turkish force which enjoyed the advantage of operating on interior lines. The rough parity was sustained as the campaign progressed with the thirteen Allied divisions eventually facing fourteen Turkish divisions. The half-hearted approach in London, until July 1915, ensured that the Allied build-up was always too little too late. Inadequate leadership played a part in the Allied failure, and many men were sacrificed in futile attacks on strong positions, especially at Helles.